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Conventional tests for food market integration ask often misleadingly, whether prices in 
different locations move together.  This paper develops an alternative methodology, the parity 
bounds model (PBM), which uses information on transfer costs in addition to food prices to 
assess the efficiency of spatial arbitrage.  Monte Carlo experiments using data generated by a 
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application to Philippine rice markets demonstrates that the PBM detects efficient arbitrage 
when other tests do not. 
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The issue of market integration lies at the heart of many contemporary debates concerning 
market liberalization, price policy and parastatal reform in developing country food markets. 
Integration of food markets is also a precondition for effective reform in many of the former 
centrally planned economies.  Without spatial integration of markets, price signals will not be 
transmitted from urban food deficit to rural food surplus areas, prices will be more volatile, 
agricultural producers will fail to specialize according to long-term comparative advantage, and 
the gains from trade will not be realized.   
 Many studies have been devoted to testing for market integration but nearly all of these 
studies approach the issue of market integration indirectly.  Rather than examining 
transportation systems, interviewing traders, tracking shipments and looking for unexploited 
arbitrage opportunities, most researchers have used time-series econometrics applied to 
observed food prices.  Despite widespread recognition of the inferential dangers in using 
measures of price correlation to test for market integration (Blyn; Harriss), more recent time-
series techniques involving Granger causality (Gupta and Mueller), error-correction (Ravallion) 
and cointegration (Alexander and Wyeth) are still based on assessing the co-movement of food 
prices.  All such conventional tests rely on price data alone and fail to recognize the pivotal role 
played by transfer costs.  Many researchers also make erroneous assumptions concerning the 
continuity of trade flows between markets and the nature of price formation in multi-market 
systems.  In consequence, food markets that are well-functioning are often diagnosed as 
exhibiting incomplete and/or lagged price adjustment (Baulch). 
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 If time series were available on trade flows and transfer costs in addition to nominal food 
prices, problems with conventional tests could be easily circumvented.  Indeed, testing for the 
efficiency of spatial arbitrage would reduce to a series of repetitive arithmetic calculations of 
whether trade occurred whenever the intermarket price differential equalled or exceeded transfer 
costs.  Unfortunately, time series data on trade flows and transfer costs are rarely available to the 
food price analyst and, even when they are, such data are usually not of the same periodicity as 
the available food price data.  Furthermore, it is inadvisable to estimate transfer costs based on 
inter-market price differentials when trade flows between two markets are infrequent but occur 
regularly between each of the two and a third market.  In such circumstances, price differentials 
between the first two markets do not reflect the cost of moving produce between them. Inter-
market price spreads may also reflect factors other than pure transfer costs (such as the effect of 
government controls on produce flows, transportation bottlenecks, or oligopolistic pricing). 
 Transfer costs, however, should not be disregarded in assessing food market integration. 
 Accurate information on the different components of transfer costs at a single point in time is 
usually available to the food price analyst from structure-conduct-performance studies or from 
interviews with traders.  At this point in time, there will be little ambiguity about the arbitrage 
relationships connecting markets since the only element of transactions costs that cannot be 
measured with precision is the trader's margin.  Transfer costs in other periods obviously will 
vary over time, so an extrapolation from observed transfers costs in one period will be subject to 
inaccuracies.  But as long as care is taken to ensure that no significant element of transfer costs 
is omitted from the calculation for the single period, the extrapolation of transfer costs to other 
periods provides a useful starting estimate of transfer costs over the whole time series.  
 Accordingly, this paper develops and tests the statistical reliability of a new 
methodology of testing for food market integration: the parity bounds model (PBM).  This 
model extends earlier work on stochastic frontier and switching regression models (Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt; Spiller and Wood; Sexton, Kling and Carman) by using explicit 
information on transfer costs at a single point in time, in addition to nominal food prices, to 
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assess the efficiency of inter-market arbitrage for each period in the sample.  The model takes 
explicit account of the possibility of discontinuous trade between markets, the simultaneous 
determination of prices, and the statistical problems posed by common trends_ especially by 
non-stationary and cointegrated time series.   It also allows transfer costs to vary between 
periods, makes no implicit assumptions concerning the nature of marketing margins, and may be 
estimated using time series that are incomplete_as is often the case with food price series in 
developing countries. 
 The next section describes the problems associated with conventional approaches to 
testing market integration while the third section outlines the specification of the PBM.  Monte 
Carlo experiments are then used to assess the statistical reliability of the PBM employing price 
and trade flow data generated by a point-space model of spatial price equilibrium with both 
production shocks and general price inflation.  The PBM is shown to be able to detect violations 
of the spatial arbitrage conditions with a high degree of accuracy when estimated with sample 
sizes that are typical of the short food price series available in most developing countries.  
Finally, the PBM is applied to wholesale rice markets in the Philippines, and the results are 
contrasted with those of conventional tests for market integration. 
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Problems with Conventional Approaches to Testing Food Market Integration 
Techniques for testing market integration have come a long way since the days when Jones and 
Lele first used bi-variate correlation coefficients to describe the behavior of staple food prices in 
Nigeria and India.  Considerable progress has been made in designing test procedures that take 
account of common trends and the non-stationarity of food price series.  Some advances also 
have been made in designing tests that account for the endogeneity of food prices.  But none of 
the current approaches to testing market integration has challenged the basis of the correlation 
coefficients approach: that market integration can be discerned by assessing the underlying co-
movement of prices and without reference to transfer costs. 
 Two markets may be said to be spatially integrated if, when trade takes place between 
them, price in the importing market equals price in the exporting market plus the transportation 
and other transfer costs involved in moving food between them.1  Put differently, if Pti denotes 
the price of food in the exporting market in period t, Ptj denotes the contemporaneous price of 
food in the importing market, and Ktij  denotes transfer costs in the same period, then whenever 
 
trade occurs.  But if 
 
then there is no incentive to trade.  Equations (1) and (2) are known in the literature as the 
spatial arbitrage conditions and both are consistent with food market integration.  Market 
integration does not itself, however, imply that food markets are competitive.  The spatial  
(1) P = K + P jtijtit  
(2) P > K + P jtijtit  
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arbitrage conditions are also consistent with such oligopolistic pricing practices as basing point 
pricing (Faminov and Benson). 
 Existing approaches to testing market integration may be divided into two broad 
categories.  Approaches such as the "Law of One Price" (Richardson) and the Ravallion model 
(Ravallion) are based on testing for the perfect co-movement of prices.  These tests assume that 
if markets are integrated, price changes in one market will be transmitted on a one-for-one basis 
to other markets either instantaneously (the Law of One Price and Ravallion's tests for short-run 
integration) or over a number of observations (Ravallion's test for long-run integration).  Unless, 
however, trade flows occur between the two markets under consideration in every period, 
demand and supply shocks cannot be guaranteed to cause one-for-one co-movement in prices.   
Furthermore, non-random variations in transfer costs may cause the Law of One Price and 
Ravallion model to reject market integration even when the spatial arbitrage conditions always 
hold.  Implementation of these tests also requires a choice between absolute or proportional 
marketing margins as a maintained hypothesis and, when ordinary least squares estimation is 
used, the assumption that prices in one market are exogenously determined is required. 
 Other approaches, such as Granger causality (Gupta and Mueller) and cointegration 
(Alexander and Wyeth; Dercon), test for more general notions of equilibrium.  These tests allow 
for price co-movement to be less than perfect, allow for prices to be simultaneously determined, 
and permit seasonal variations in transfer costs.  But these tests ignore transfer costs and assume 
a linear relationship between market prices, which is inconsistent with the discontinuities in 
trade implied by the spatial arbitrage conditions.  They, therefore, are consistent with situations 
in which the spatial arbitrage conditions are systematically violated  
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(Baulch) and should be regarded as neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for market 
integration (Barrett).2 
 Monte Carlo analysis indicates that the statistical reliability of both categories of market 
integration tests is low.  Baulch reports that hypothesis tests for short-run market integration, 
based on the Law of One Price and the Ravallion model, were performed on simulated price 
data from markets that were instantaneously integrated by construction, and that they were 
rejected more than twice as often as they should be.  In contrast, the Granger causality and 
cointegration approaches were unable to distinguish integrated from independent markets when 
both were subject to a common, exogenous inflationary process.   In short, conventional 
approaches to testing market integration place the food price analyst in a dilemma.  Some tests 
are too strong to detect market integration and others are too weak.  None attempt to compare 
time series of observed price differentials with  transfer costs, although this would seem to be 
the obvious method of testing for market integration.  Indeed, no conventional tests make use of 
any information about actual transfer costs.  The assumptions in the conventional approaches to 
testing market integration and their statistically driven definitions of market integration, 
therefore, are inappropriate to most real world food markets. 
 
Motivation and Specification of the Parity Bounds Model 
Transfer costs (comprising transportation, loading and unloading costs, and trader's normal 
profit) determine the parity bounds within which the prices of a homogenous commodity in two 
geographically distinct markets can vary independently.  When transfer costs equal the inter-
market price differential (or spread) and there are no impediments to trade between markets, 
trade will cause prices in the two markets to move on a one-for-one basis and the spatial 
arbitrage conditions are binding.   When transfer costs exceed the inter-market spread, trade will 
not occur and the spatial arbitrage conditions will not be binding.  When spreads exceed transfer 
costs, the spatial arbitrage conditions are violated whether or not trade occurs.  Violation of the 
spatial arbitrage conditions indicates that there are impediments to trade between markets and 
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should be viewed as primae facie evidence of a lack of market integration. 
 Accordingly, the parity bounds model (PBM) developed in this paper assesses the extent 
of market integration by distinguishing among three possible trade regimes: 
Regime 1:  at the parity bounds (in which spatial price differentials equal transfer costs); 
Regime 2:  inside the parity bounds (in which price differentials are less than transfer 
costs); and 
Regime 3:  outside the parity bounds (in which price differentials exceed transfer costs). 
When production and consumption are specialized_so that production of food occurs in different 
geographical locations from where it is consumed (i.e., there is no on-farm consumption)_only 
regime 1 is consistent with market integration.  But when production and consumption are non-
specialized_as is usually the case in developing country food markets_both regimes 1 and 2 are 
consistent with the spatial arbitrage conditions and market integration.  In either case, regime 3 
is inconsistent with integration, so that the higher the incidence of regime 3, the lower is the 
extent of market integration. 
 If time-series data were available on transfer costs, in addition to nominal food prices, 
dividing observations into these three regimes could be performed by a series of repetitive 
arithmetic calculations.  Each period's observed transfer costs could be deducted from that 
period's inter-market price differential and the number of observations that were zero (regime 1), 
negative (regime 2) or positive (regime 3) could be recorded.  But, as noted above, time-series 
data on transportation charges and the other elements of traders' transfer costs are rarely 
available to the food price analyst.  If, however, intermarket price spreads can be compared with 
exact information on transfer costs obtained from a structure-conduct-performance study or by 
interviewing traders, it is possible to establish probablistic limits within which the spatial 
arbitrage conditions are likely to be binding in other periods.  This is the central idea behind the 
parity bounds model. 
 In situations where food prices are non-stationary, as is usually the case, the probablistic 
limits (or confidence interval) for the spatial arbitrage conditions can be established in two 
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stages.  First, the single period information on transfer costs is extrapolated into a time series by 
deflating it by the consumer price index (or some other suitable measure of the trend in the 
general price level).3  This stage allows the single period information on transfer costs to be 
compared with the inter-market price differential in other periods.  Second, maximum likelihood 
techniques are used to determine the upper and lower parity bounds within which the 
extrapolated nominal transfer cost series are likely to vary based on the magnitude of observed 
price differentials.  Figure 1 illustrates the upper and lower parity bounds defined by the 
confidence interval around extrapolated transfer costs, and how this divides the inter-market 
price spread into the PBM's three regimes. 
 More formally, the deviation of the inter-market price spread from extrapolated transfer 
costs in any period may be decomposed into three components: a symmetric error term with 
mean zero (et) applying to transfer costs plus two error terms truncated from above at zero (ut 
and vt) which are subtracted or added according to whether price differentials are inside or 
outside the parity bounds.  The first error term (et) allows transfer costs to vary between periods, 
in response to seasonality or changing capacity utilization in the transportation sector.  The 
second error term (ut) captures the extent to which price differentials fall short of the parity 
bounds when there is no incentive to trade.  The size of ut depends on the relative imbalance 
between demand and supply in individual markets.  The third error term (vt) measures by how 
much price differentials exceed transfer costs when the spatial arbitrage conditions are violated. 
 This term shows the extent to which markets are prevented from trading because of 
transportation bottlenecks, oligopsonistic pricing practices, government controls on produce 
flows or other impediments to the movement of goods between markets. 
 Utilizing a result derived by Weinstein for the density of a normal plus half normal 
distribution, and following Sexton, Kling and Carman, the likelihood function for the PBM may 
be specified as: 
(3) )]f)--(1 + f + f[  = L 3t21
2
t2
1
t1
T
=1t
λλλλ∏  
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 where 
    Regime 1: at the parity bounds 
 
    Regime 2: inside the parity bounds 
 
    Regime 3: outside the parity bounds 
Here λ1 and λ2 denote the probabilities for regimes 1 and 2,  and Yt represents the absolute 
value of the natural logarithm of the price spread between markets i and j in period t (i.e., 
Yt=ln{Pit-Pjt}); σe, σu and σv are the standard deviations of the three error terms et, ut and vt 
described above; Kt is the logarithm of nominal transfer costs in period t, while φ(.) and Φ(.) 
denote the standard normal density and distribution functions.  To obtain probability estimates 
for the three regimes of the PBM, the logarithm of this function may be maximized numerically 
with respect to λ1, λ2, σe, σu and σv using the David-Fletcher-Powell (or some other suitable) 
algorithm.4 
 This specification differs from that of Sexton, Kling and Carman in three ways.  First, 
the transfer costs series (Kt) is an exogenously determined series, extrapolated from known 
transfer costs in a single time period, rather than an endogenously estimated parameter.  This 
facilitates accurate sample separation between regimes and avoids the difficulties with 
estimating transfer costs based on inter-market price spreads noted above.  Second, the half 
normal error terms in the likelihood functions for regimes 2 and 3 are allowed to have different 
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variances.  It does not seem reasonable to force the variances for the two regimes to be equal, as 
Sexton, Kling and Carman do.  Third, price spreads were expressed in terms of the log of the 
absolute intermarket price spread forcing transfer costs to be symmetric (i.e., that it costs on 
average as much to ship one ton of produce from market i to market j, as from j to i).  This is 
clearly an unrealistic assumption but greatly facilitates the maximization of the PBM's 
likelihood function and does not affect its accuracy unless seasonal reversals in agricultural 
trade flows actually occur.5 
 For illustrative purposes, the results of the application of the PBM to the data underlying 
figure 1 are shown in table 1.6  The estimate of λ1 shows that price differentials are at their 
parity bounds in 88.1% of the observations.  Similarly, the estimate for λ2 indicates that price 
spreads are inside the parity bounds in another 5.6% of the observations.  Since the probability 
estimates for the three regimes must sum to one, price differentials must be outside their parity 
bounds in 6.3% (i.e., 1.0-0.881-0.056) of the observations.  This would indicate a modest degree 
of market disintegration between markets i and j.7  The relative sizes of the three variance terms 
together with their standard errors indicate that, as one would expect, price spreads are much 
more volatile when outside or inside the parity bounds than when at them.  The t-statistics 
indicate that all parameter estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 These parameter estimates provide much richer information on the extent of market 
integration than the dichotomous hypothesis tests of the conventional approaches of testing for 
market integration.  In the latter case, the food price analyst is restricted to "accepting" or 
rejecting a null hypothesis (possibly nested) at some predetermined significance level.  But the 
parity bounds model allows for markets to be integrated in some periods but not in others.  
Statistical hypotheses tests for the presence of market integration still can be conducted by 
testing the null hypothesis that λ1+λ2=1.  But the food price analyst also may choose to avoid 
the "accept"/reject nature of such test procedures by focusing on the magnitude of the regime 
probabilities themselves.  The parameter λ3, for example, shows how frequently the spatial 
arbitrage conditions are violated and may be interpreted as a index of market efficiency (in 
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which values close to zero indicate that the spatial arbitrage is usually efficient).   
 
Monte Carlo Results 
To assess the statistical reliability of the PBM, a series of Monte Carlo experiments were 
performed using time series generated by a spatial price equilibrium model in the point-space 
tradition of Samuelson, and Takayama and Judge.  In this model, five discontinuous regions 
with identical demand characteristics but different (and stochastic) levels of supply trade a 
homogeneous commodity under competitive marketing conditions.  Spatial price equilibrium is 
established when all arbitrage opportunities between regions have been exhausted, so that price 
in importing regions equals price in the regions which export to them plus transfer costs.  The 
direction and magnitude of trade flows between regions varies from period to period according 
to imbalances in excess demand, which are in turn driven by a series of uncorrelated harvest 
shocks occurring once a period in each region.  All prices generated by the model experience a 
common upward trend due to an exogenously determined, stochastic inflationary process driven 
by macro policy.  The inflationary process affects all regions equally and renders their food 
prices series non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences (i.e., I(1)).8 
 Three alternative trading scenarios for the spatial price equilibrium model_ integrated, 
partially integrated and independent markets_are considered in the Monte Carlo simulations. In 
the first scenario, the "integrated markets case", there are no impediments to trade between 
markets and the spatial arbitrage conditions hold in 100% of the observations.  This does not, 
however, mean that markets always trade; sometimes price differentials are less than transfer 
costs so there is no incentive to trade.  In the second scenario, the "partially integrated markets 
case", an impediment to trade occurs in 10% of the observations.  Readers may find it helpful to 
think of typhoons, heavy rains, government controls on produce flows, or periodic road blocks 
as the cause of these impediments.9  The third scenario, the "independent markets case", 
assumes that markets are prevented from trading with each other even though price differentials 
always exceed transfer costs.  Prices in each market are therefore exogenously determined and 
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price differentials are outside the parity bounds in 100% of the observations. 
 Tables 2 and 3 shows the mean, maximum and minimum biases for each of the regime 
probabilities (λs) when the PBM is estimated using data generated by these three variants of the 
spatial price equilibrium model described above.  One-thousand replications, each with either 
120 or 60 observations, were performed for each trading scenario.10  Bias is defined as the 
estimated minus the true regime probabilities (i-λi).  So, if the PBM estimated the regime 
probabilities without error, all biases would be equal to zero.  The mean bias entries therefore 
show the average discrepancy between the PBM's estimates of the regime probabilities and the 
true incidence of trade in one thousand replications of the PBM model.  Negative mean biases 
indicate that the PBM under-estimates the underlying regime probabilities on average; positive 
biases indicate it over-estimates them. 
 Tables 2 and 3 shows that the PBM is able to distinguish between integrated and 
independent markets rather successfully.  When applied to the integrated markets case  (where 
there are only two regimes in the underlying data generation mechanism), the mean bias for 
regime 3 is tiny (7.3 E-07 and 4.0E-08, respectively).  Similarly, when it is applied to the 
independent markets case (where there is only one regime in the underlying data generation 
mechanism), the mean biases for regimes 1 and 2 are each one-tenth of one percent.  The largest 
mean biases occur in the partially integrated markets case but even here they are relatively 
small.  With a sample size 120 observations (table 2), the mean bias for the crucial regime 3 is  
0.0025, compared to 0.035 with 60 observations (table 3).  Since by construction the spatial 
arbitrage conditions are violated in 10% of the observations in this case, on average the parity 
bounds model estimates the probability of violation of the arbitrage conditions to within 2.5% 
(i.e., 0.0025/.01 x 100 for table 2) or 3.5% (table 3) of their true values. 
 For individual replications, higher or lower biases naturally occur.  The range of 
maximum and minimum biases occurring in every Monte Carlo experiment also are shown in 
tables 2 and 3.  However, a more comprehensive picture of the magnitude of the biases is given 
by plotting histograms of their values for all one thousand replications. 
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These show that extreme biases occur very rarely.  In the integrated markets case, for example, 
most biases for regime 1 are in the -0.032 to 0.015 range, those for regime 2 range from -0.015 
to 0.04, while those for regime 3 are negligible. 
 The rare occurrence of some points of extreme biases together with the failure to attain 
convergence in some replications (see the final column of tables 2 and 3) points to a distinctive 
feature of the PBM.  In common with all stochastic switching regression models, the PBM is in 
the class of maximum likelihood estimators which are unbounded in parameter space.  Such 
models have likelihood functions with spikes at the edges of their parameter space, and where 
gradients tend toward singularity.  Such spikes either cause the non-convergence of the solution 
algorithm (because their gradients cannot be evaluated) or for convergence to occur at a local 
rather than a global maximum (leading to the rare occurrences of the points of extreme bias 
noted above).   These convergence problems have two practical implications for the 
implementation of the PBM.  First, convergence problems cannot always be solved by choosing 
a new set of starting values or by using a different maximization algorithm (Quandt).  Second, t-
statistics in the hundreds or thousands indicate that the edge of the parameter space has been 
encountered.  At such points standard statistical inference becomes invalid because of the local 
violation of the second regularity condition required for the consistency and asymptotic 
normality of maximum likelihood estimators (Davidson and MacKinnon). 
 
Empirical Application 
This section applies the PBM to the integration of wholesale rice markets in the Philippines.11  
This country provides an interesting case study of the practical application of such tests because 
the uneven geographical and seasonal distribution of rice production and consumption creates a 
natural tendency to trade within this archipelago.  Based on an examination of the regional 
demand-supply balance and pattern of inter-regional trade, five of the Philippines's twelve 
regions plus Metro Manila have been selected for inclusion in the analysis. Region II (Northern 
Luzon), Region III (Central Luzon) and Region VI (Western Visayas) are the country's principal 
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rice surplus regions.  Metro Manila, the national capital, and Region VII (Central Visayas) are 
the principal rice deficit regions. Region IX (Western Mindanao) is a relatively isolated area that 
is close to self-sufficiency in rice production.  The price data used in the empirical analysis are 
the monthly wholesale price series for special grade rice collected by the Philippine Bureau of 
Agricultural Statistics between January 1980 and June 1993.  Application of the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test shows all these series to be non-stationary in levels but stationary in first 
differences.12  
 Inter-island shipping provides the major mode of transportation between these regions, 
although road transport is also important for the transportation of rice from regions II and III to 
Metro Manila.  Several shipping lines compete on all major inter-island shipping routes with the 
exception of Iloilo (Region VI) to Cebu (Region VII) where one shipping line has the monopoly. 
 There are twice or thrice weekly services between most major ports with daily services between 
Manila, Cebu and Iloilo.  Shipping freight rates do not vary according to the direction of 
shipment and are regulated, along with wharfage and arrastre charges, by the Philippine national 
authorities. It, therefore, was possible to establish  
the exact unit shipping costs between regions at a single point in time by summing the  
approved freight rate for "basic class commodities" (which includes rice) with the wharfage, 
loading and unloading charges that are set on a port by port basis.  For markets connected by 
road, where haulage rates are not controlled, unit freight costs were established by interviewing 
traders concerning the rates they paid for trucking, loading and unloading using the most 
commonly used truck/trailer combination.  To these unit freight costs estimates was added the 
five to eight peso margin revealed in a survey of traders conducted by the author in the summer 
of 1993.  In the absence of an index of transportation costs, the resulting market specific transfer 
costs were then extrapolated into a series by deflating by the All Philippine Consumer Price 
Index. 
 The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the PBM are shown in table 8.  If, 
as suggested in the second section, the sum of the probabilities of regimes 1 and 2 is interpreted 
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as the probability of market integration, the results indicate that Philippine rice markets are 
integrated within a single data period almost 100% of the time.  These findings are consistent 
with the trader survey conducted by the author, the existence of good telecommunication links 
between all the markets considered, and the frequency of shipping services relative to the 
monthly periodicity of the price data used.13  However, the significant probabilities for regime 2 
for all markets except regions VI and VII indicate that there are discontinuities over time in 
trade flows between regions.14  Such discontinuities are in line with inter-island shipping records 
and also with the results of the author's trader survey, which indicated that wholesalers in 
demand deficit areas switch between alternative sources of supply in response to changing 
arbitrage opportunities. 
 The PBM results are, however, at odds with the results of conventional tests for market 
integration reviewed in the second section.   Using the same monthly regional price data, these 
tests indicate that Philippine rice prices are cointegrated and simultaneously determined but with 
a lag of between one and two months. The estimation of long-run multipliers (which are all 
significantly different from one) and the rejection of the Law of One Price, Ravallion's test for 
short-run market integration at the one-percent level between all market pairs indicates that 
price adjustment is not one-for-one.15  The usual interpretation of such results, which are similar 
to other studies of food market integration conducted in the Philippines (Mendoza and 
Rosegrant), is that markets are imperfectly integrated and price adjustment between them is 
sluggish.  However, an alternative explanation of these results is that the failure of conventional 
tests to detect high levels of market integration is due to their failure to take account of 
transactions costs and the resulting discontinuity of trade flows between regions.  The results of 
the conventional tests for market integration and the PBM are therefore quite consistent, even 
though their interpretations appear contradictory. 
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Conclusions  
This article has sought to develop and test the statistical reliability of a new methodology of 
testing for food market integration: the parity bounds model.  Unlike conventional approaches to 
testing market integration, this model recognizes the pivotal role played by transfer costs and the 
spatial arbitrage conditions.  By using information on the level of transfer costs in a single 
period in addition to nominal food price series, the parity bounds model is able to distinguish 
between inter-market price spreads that coincide with, are inside, or are outside the parity 
bounds.  This allows the food price analyst to go beyond the conventional tests for market 
integration based on the co-movement of prices and to recognize that efficient markets may be 
linked by  discontinuous trade flows.  The parity bounds model is also consistent with other 
well-known characteristics of developing country food markets.  Its maximum likelihood 
procedure allows food prices to be simultaneously determined, it allows for transfer costs to 
vary between periods, and it makes no implicit assumptions concerning the form of traders' 
marketing margins.   
 Monte Carlo experiments based on data generated by a stochastic spatial price 
equilibrium model with sample sizes of sixty and 120 observations demonstrate that the parity 
bounds model can detect violations of the spatial arbitrage conditions with a high degree of 
accuracy.  An application of the parity bounds model to wholesale rice markets in the 
Philippines shows that the model detects efficient spatial arbitrage in situations where 
conventional tests fail to do so because of the existence of discontinuous trade flows. 
 Three limitations of the PBM, however, must be stressed.  First, since only 
contemporaneous spreads are used in its estimation, it is hard for the PBM to take account of the 
type of lagged price adjustment postulated by the Granger causality and Ravallion models.  It is 
therefore advisable to estimate the PBM with price data that have been measured at a low 
frequency (e.g., on a monthly or quarterly basis), in order to allow sufficient time for inter-
market arbitrage to occur.  Alternatively, if a fixed lag in price adjustment can be specified a 
priori, it is possible to utilize this in calculating the price spread used in estimating the 
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likelihood function.   
 Second, it is essential that transfer costs are estimated as precisely as possible, as the 
PBM's estimates of regime probabilities are only as good as the estimate of mean transfer costs 
used to separate the inter-market price differentials between regimes.   Since time series data on 
traders' transfer costs are usually unavailable, it has been assumed that the food price analyst 
will be forced to work with transfer costs information for a single period adjusted by the 
consumer price index or some other measure of general price inflation.  If, however, more 
comprehensive information (e.g., the dates and magnitudes of, possibly seasonal, freight rate 
changes) these could be incorporated into the calculations of the transfer cost series, Kt.  Serious 
inaccuracies in the estimation of transfer costs, however, will lead to a wide transaction costs 
band (high σe) or problems with the convergence of the maximum likelihood procedure.16  
However, incorporation of additional information about transfer costs derived from a single 
period usually allows the PBM's maximum likelihood procedure to distinguish between regimes 
rather accurately. 
 Third, and probably most important, corrective policies do not follow directly from the 
results of the parity bounds model.  Violations of the spatial arbitrage conditions indicate lack of 
market integration but they do not pin-point its causes.  A high incidence of observations outside 
the parity bounds, for example, could be due to bottlenecks in the transportation sector, 
oligopolistic pricing by traders, poor transmission of price information, or government controls 
on produce flows.  Similarly, a high incidence of observations within the parity bounds may 
indicate that transfer costs are prohibitive but also that regions are usually food self-sufficient.  
The PBM provides the food price analyst with a more reliable procedure of testing for market 
integration, but a considerable amount of investigative field work is still required to interpret 
and draw policy implications from its results.  The parity bounds model is a complement rather 
than a substitute to understanding how real markets operate on the ground. 
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1. This is the same definition of market integration as used by Ravallion.  Note, however, 
that some analysts use the term market integration to refer to the frequency with which 
markets are linked by trade (Fackler). 
 
2. Cointegration is an unnecessary condition for market integration because if transfer 
costs are non-stationary, arbitrage between two markets may be efficient even when their 
prices series are not cointegrated.  Cointegration is an insufficient condition for market 
integration because two price series may be cointegrated but their price differential be too 
small to offset transfer costs.  The practical importance of cointegration is not as a test for 
market integration in its own right but as a pre-test for other econometric tests for market 
integration (Alexander and Wyeth). 
 
3. Since time-series data on transfer costs are usually unavailable, this discussion assumes 
that the food price analyst will be forced to work with a single period estimate of transfer 
costs adjusted for inflation.  If, however, more comprehensive information (e.g., dates and 
magnitude of freight rate charges) were known, they should be incorporated into the transfer 
costs series, Kt.  Seasonal variation in transportation costs also could be incorporated. 
 
4. The distributional assumption of normal and half-normal errors is, of course, 
questionable.  While it seems reasonable to specify a normal distribution for et, there is no a 
priori reason why ut or vt should be one-sided.  The Monte Carlo results in the third section, 
however, suggest that the assumption of half-normality does not bias the results of the PBM 
seriously. 
 
5. If seasonal reversals in agricultural trade flows occur and transfer costs are asymmetric 
(due, for example, to backloading), it is necessary to add another two regimes and a second 
transfer costs series to the PBM.  The model presented here, therefore, should be thought of 
as the simplest version of the general class of models with non-linear price behavior and 
exogenous estimates of transfer costs. 
 
6. Estimation of the PBM model was carried out using the ML(HCOV=D,HITER=D) 
option in TSP version 4.2 (Hall, Cummins and Schnake). 
 
7. A reviewer has noted that an alternative interpretation exists of the PBM model results. 
 The PBM's likelihood function is based on a mixture distribution, which can be viewed as a 
flexible way to model an unknown probability distribution.  Thus, non-zero and significant 
estimates of λ2 and λ3 may result from the distribution of price spreads having fat tails or 
skewness rather than because of price spreads inside and outside the parity bounds.  The 
Monte Carlo results reported in the third section, however, indicate that the parity bounds 
model is able to distinguish between trading regimes rather successfully, even when their 
underlying price spreads are skewed. 
 
8. For further details on the spatial price equilibrium model underlying the data 
generation mechanism see Baulch. 
 
9. The data in figure 1 correspond to the case of partially integrated markets. 
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10. 120 observations corresponds to ten years of monthly price data, which is typical of the 
short food price time series available in most developing countries. 
 
11. The parity bounds model has also been applied successfully to livestock markets in 
Niger (Fafchamps and Gavian). 
 
12. Similar results apply for the univariate series in natural logarithms and log differences. 
 
13. Similar results were also obtained using weekly data on wholesale rice prices obtained 
from the National Food Authority.  These results are not reported here because they relate to 
a much shorter (three-and-a-half year) data period and the existence of numerous missing 
data points in the weekly price data. 
 
14. The case of regions VI and VII illustrates the difficulties which may arise when the 
PBM encounters the edge of the parameter space during its maximum likelihood estimation.  
The author's survey of traders indicates that there are times of the year when the two regions 
did not trade with each other directly.  However, no set of starting values could be found at 
which the PBM did not "converge" at the edge of the parameter space, indicating continuous 
trade between this pair of markets. 
 
15. Pairwise tests for cointegration were conducted using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests between all possible market pairs.  The Granger causality and the Ravallion model were 
estimated in error-correction form with a lag of one to two months using both ordinary least 
squares and instrumental variable estimation.  The Law of One Price was estimated in both 
first and log-differences using ordinary least squares with correction for first-order serial 
correlation.  See Baulch for further details. 
 
16. Experimentation indicates that the PBM will fail to converge or encounter the edges of 
the parameter space when transfer costs are over or under-estimated by more than 12.5%. 
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 Table 1: A Typical Replication of the Parity Bounds Model 
 
▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 
 
Parameter   Parameter   Standard  T- 
    Estimate   Error   Statistic 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
λ1    0.881    0.0313  28.10 
λ2    0.056    0.0224   2.47 
σe    0.068    0.0048  10.38 
σu    1.371    0.3645   3.42 
σv    2.188    0.5531   4.36 
 
 Log of Likelihood Function = 68.236 
 Number of Observations = 120 ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄      
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 Table 2: Bias of the PBM's Estimated Regime Probabilities 
 (based on 1,000 replications with sample size of 120) 
 
 ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 
 
  REGIME 1  REGIME 2  REGIME 3  CONVER 
           -GENCES 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
1. Integrated Markets 
 
Mean   -0.0126  0.0126  7.3E-07 998 
Range  (-0.049, +0.035) (-0.034, +0.049) 
 
 
2. Partially Integrated Markets 
 
Mean   -0.0157  0.0144  0.0025 988 
Range  (-0.098, 0.027) (-0.025, +0.093) (-0.028, +0.062) 
 
 
3. Independent Markets 
 
Mean   0.0010  0.0010  -0.0035 942 
Range  (+0.001, +0.001) (+0.001, +0.001) (-0.027, -0.002) 
   
▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 
Notes:   Bias = (^i-λi).  Only regime probabilities that are significant at the 5% level have been used in the bias 
calculations. 
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 Table 3: Bias of the PBM's Estimated Regime Probabilities 
 (based on 1,000 replications with sample size of 60) 
 
 ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 
 
  REGIME 1  REGIME 2  REGIME 3  CONVER 
           -GENCES 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
1. Integrated Markets 
 
Mean   -0.0127  0.0135  4.0E-08 999 
Range  (-0.082, +0.04) (-0.04, +0.082) 
 
 
2. Partially Integrated Markets 
 
Mean   -0.0204  0.0234  0.003  913 
Range  (-0.344, 0.085) (-0.116, +0.116) (-0.04, +0.048) 
 
 
3. Independent Markets 
 
Mean   0.001   0.001   -0.0036 929 
Range  (+0.001, +0.001) (+0.001, +0.042) (-0.040, -0.002) 
   
▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 
Notes:   Bias = (^i-λi).  Only regime probabilities that are significant at the 5% level have been used in the bias 
calculations. 
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 Table 4: The Parity Bounds Model's Estimated Regime 
 Probabilities for Philippine Wholesale Rice Markets 
 
 ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 
 
    Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
      
Region II-Manila   0.939   0.061   6.3E-06 
    (0.000) (0.039) (0.965) 
 
Region III-Manila   0.582   0.417   3.1E-07 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.994) 
 
Manila-Region VII   0.754   0.246   6.6E-08 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.997) 
 
Manila-Region IX   0.357   0.642   2.2E-06 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.980) 
 
Region VI-Manila   0.774   0.225   3.2E-08 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.15) 
 
Region VI-Region VII  0.999   0.001   1.2E-10 
    (0.00*) (0.00*) (0.992) 
 
Region VI-Region IX  0.871   0.128   4.8E-07 
    (0.000) (0.004) (0.992) 
 
Region VII-Region IX  0.211   0.789   0.000 
    (0.005) (0.000) (0.881) 
 ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄  
Notes: P-values in parentheses.  * indicates that P-values may be invalid as edge of parameter space was encountered 
during estimation 
 
 
